University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Prize Winning Papers

Student Papers

2021

It’s Good for the Planet and It’s Good for Your Portfolio:
Encouraging Millennial Participation in 401(k) Plans Through
Lowering Barriers To ESG Investing
Rachel Baker Mann

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/prize_papers
Part of the Law Commons

IT’S GOOD FOR THE PLANET AND IT’S GOOD FOR YOUR PORTFOLIO:
ENCOURAGING MILLENNIAL PARTICIPATION IN 401(K) PLANS THROUGH LOWERING BARRIERS TO
ESG INVESTING

RACHEL BAKER MANN1
Investors are demanding greener and cleaner investment options. These values-based investors
are increasingly pursing a strategy known as ESG, where a company’s environmental, social,
and governance decisions are included in the overall investment process. This strategy is
especially popular among millennials, who are particularly concerned about climate change and
other social justice issues. In a recent survey, 90% of millennials stated they would be interested
in an ESG option in their 401(k) retirement plan lineup. Yet, only 3% of employers offer one.
Employers’ reticence to offer an ESG option is understandable in light of Department of Labor
regulations that suggest doing so might violate the strict fiduciary requirements under the
federal law regulating employee benefit plans (known as ERISA.) The Department of Labor
justified this regulation by suggesting that ESG is a suspect strategy that values a positive impact
on the planet over maximizing financial returns. But long-term research into ESG investing
shows this concern is unwarranted—ESG investments perform as well, and sometimes better
than, non-ESG investments, which makes sense when you understand the ESG strategy to be
simply another layer of investment analysis and risk management.
ESG investing does not violate any of ERISA’s fiduciary requirements. To the contrary, ESG
investing offers values-based investors the rare win-win—it is good for the planet, and it is good
for their retirement portfolio. The Department of Labor should re-write the ESG regulations
accordingly to encourage more employers to offer an ESG option. In turn, offering an ESG
option may encourage more millennials to participate in their 401(k)s, saving more for
retirement while also providing a market incentive for companies to get greener. An ESG
investment option in a 401(k) plan lineup would be good for a portfolio and good for the planet.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine the stereotypical millennial—what comes to mind? Do you think of avocado
toast?2 Side parts and skinny jeans?3 Maybe you think of the recent runup of GameStop and the
increasing popularity of millennial investing websites like Robinhood,4 or the millennial (and
Gen-Z) dominated protests for climate change5 and racial equity.6
Stereotypes aside, one of the defining features of the millennial generation is its focus on
corporate values and sustainability. 71% report feeling their lives are immediately threatened by
climate change.7 70% of millennials actively consider a company’s values when making a
purchase, as compared with 52% of all adults.8 90% say they want to tailor their investments to
their values.9
Millennials’ focus on sustainability and values-based investing is no surprise, given the
increasing threat of climate change that looms over this generation. But many millennials, and
Americans in general, do not have access to a sustainable investment option that might accord
with their values. For more than 20% of Americans, their only form of investment vehicle is their
401(k),10 and only 3% of employers offer a sustainable investment option in their 401(k)
lineup.11 It is possible that encouraging more employers to offer sustainable investment options

2

Sam Levin, Millionaire Tells Millennials: If you Want a House, Stop Buying Avocado Toast, THE GUARDIAN (May
15, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2017/may/15/australian-millionaire-millennials-avocado-toasthouse.
3
Erica Tempesta, Millennials Go to War with Gen Z Over Skinny Jeans and Side Parts, THE DAILY MAIL (Feb. 5,
2021), https://www.msn.com/en-us/lifestyle/lifestyle-buzz/millennials-go-to-war-with-gen-z-over-skinny-jeans-andside-parts/ar-BB1dr8l3.
4
Miles Brignall, How GameStop Traders Fired the First Shot in Millennials’ War on Wall Street, THE GUARDIAN
(Jan. 30, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2021/jan/30/how-gamestop-traders-fired-the-first-shots-inmillenials-war-on-wall-street; Dave Fogel, Millennials and the Robinhood Revolution, American Bar Ass’n: After
the Bar, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/after-the-bar/student-loans-andfinances/millennials-robinhood-revolution/.
5
Matthew Ballew, Jennifer Marlon, et al, Young Adults, Across Party Lines, Are More Willing to Take Climate
Action, YALE PROGRAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMUNICATION (April 28, 2020),
https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/publications/young-adults-climate-activism/.
6
Ruth Milkman, A New Political Generation: Millennials and the Post-2008 Wave of Protest, 82(1) AM.
SOCIOLOGICAL R. 1, 1 (2017), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0003122416681031.
7
Climate Change Will Still Matter to Gen Z & Millennials—Here’s How We Know, YPULSE (April 22, 2020),
https://www.ypulse.com/article/2020/04/22/climate-change-will-still-matter-to-gen-z-millennials-heres-how-weknow/.
8
Anjali Lai, Millennials Call for Values-Driven Companies, But They’re Not the Only Ones Interested, FORBES
(May 23, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forrester/2018/05/23/millennials-call-for-values-driven-companiesbut-theyre-not-the-only-ones-interested/?sh=1a6d0d7d5464.
9
MSCI, SWIPE TO INVEST: THE STORY BEHIND MILLENNIALS AND ESG INVESTING 1 (March 2020),
https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/07e7a7d3-59c3-4d0b-b0b5029e8fd3974b#:~:text=%E2%80%9CDemand%20for%20sustainable%20investments%20is,management%20clients
%20at%20Ernst%20%26%20Young.
10
GARY MOTTOLA, A SNAPSHOT OF INVESTOR HOUSEHOLDS IN AMERICA, FINRA INVESTOR EDUCATION
FOUNDATION (Sept. 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fixed-income-advisory-committee/finrainvestor-education-foundation-investor-households-fimsa-040918.pdf.
11
Greg Iacurci, Climate Funds Hold Less than 1% of 401(k) Money. Here’s Why, CNBC (Dec. 14, 2020),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/11/heres-why-401k-plans-lag-in-green-investment-options.html.
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in their 401(k) lineups could encourage more millennials, who are vastly under saving for
retirement,12 to participate more and contribute in greater amounts to their 401(k)s.
Millennials are not the only group interested in sustainable investing. A sustainable
investment strategy known as “ESG investing” is popular across all generations. Individual and
institutional investors are increasingly promoting ESG investing. This strategy involves
identifying companies that have a positive impact on the planet (using certain environmental,
social, and governance, or “ESG”, factors) and then directing assets towards those companies,
either through purchasing individual stocks or bonds, or through building and buying ESGfriendly funds.13
Currently, a third of all U.S. professionally managed assets are held in funds using some
form of ESG investing strategy, to the tune of $17 trillion dollars.14 And over $1.7 trillion are
invested directly in ESG funds15 (not all funds using ESG strategies self-identify as an “ESG
fund.”)16 But these dollars invested in ESG funds are overwhelming in taxable accounts, and are
almost exclusively not in retirement accounts. In fact, less than 0.1% of total 401(k) assets (less
than $9 billion) are invested in ESG funds.17 ESG is vastly underrepresented in 401(k) plans.
The discrepancy between taxable assets invested in funds using ESG investing strategies
and employer-sponsored retirement assets invested in ESG-type funds is because of a lack of
ESG-friendly 401(k) investment options. Fewer than 3% of employers offer an ESG investment
in their 401(k) lineup.18 The dearth of ESG in 401(k) plans makes it harder for employees to
access ESG and likely makes 401(k) plans less desirable savings vehicles for values-based
investors, such as many millennials. This lack of ESG access for retirement plan investors is due
to the Trump-era Department of Labor’s strict regulation of retirement plan fiduciaries, and the
current regulatory framework around what type of investments are allowed in employersponsored, participant-direct retirement plans.
A Trump Administration U.S Department of Labor regulation19 entitled “Financial
Factors for Selecting Plan Investments,” —also known as the ESG Rule20— increases the burden
upfront for retirement plan providers who want to offer an ESG option in their lineup by
12

Employment Alert: Young Workers Face Hard Times in Retirement, 1 EMP. ALERT 11, 28 (Jan. 14, 2011),
available at
https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I873fa4701d7c11e08b05fdf15589d8e8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=D
efault&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0 (finding that millennials are at the highest risk of retirement
insecurity compared to older generations, and predicting that eight out of ten millennials will not be able to meet
their financial needs in retirement without significant changes in their saving and investing behaviors.)
13
Alana Benson, ESG Investing: A Beginner’s Guide, NERDWALLET (April 6, 20201),
https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/investing/esg-investing.
14
PARNASSUS INVESTMENTS, REPORT ON US SUSTAINABLE AND IMPACT INVESTING TRENDS 1 (2020),
https://www.ussif.org/files/Trends%20Report%202020%20Executive%20Summary.pdf.
15
Simon Jessop & Elizabeth Howcroft, Sustainable Fund Assets hit Record $1.7 Trillion in 2020: Morningstar,
REUTERS (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-funds-sustainable/sustainable-fund-assets-hitrecord-1-7-trln-in-2020-morningstar-idUSKBN29X2NM.
16
Sophie Baker, Global ESG-data Driven Assets Hit $40.5 trillion, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (July 2, 2020),
https://www.pionline.com/esg/global-esg-data-driven-assets-hit-405-trillion.
17
Greg Iacurci, Climate Funds Hold Less than 1% of 401(k) Money. Here’s Why, CNBC (Dec. 14, 2020),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/11/heres-why-401k-plans-lag-in-green-investment-options.html.
18
Id.
19
Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 29 C.F.R. 2509, available at
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/11/13/2020-24515/financial-factors-in-selecting-plan-investments.
20
Maureen J. Gorman & Debra B. Hoffman, The Department of Labor’s ESG-less Final ESG Rule, MAYER BROWN:
BENEFITS & COMPENSATION BLOG (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.usbenefits.law/2020/11/the-dol-final-esg-rule/
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requiring them to excessively document the process and rationale upfront for selecting a fund
relying on “non pecuniary” factors, such as ESG. The Labor Department justified this strict
regulation of ESG investing by centering it within the narrow focus that the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) takes towards ensuring retirement security. To
ensure that workers’ retirement savings are adequately managed, ERISA sets out strict fiduciary
duties of loyalty solely to the plan beneficiaries and prudence as to the process of selecting and
monitoring fiscally responsible investment options.21 But ruling out ESG funds for fiduciary
reasons is flawed for (at least) two reasons.
First, this justification sets up a false dichotomy between good financial returns and ESG
factors. It fails to recognize that employers and their fiduciaries can increase retirement saving
through allowing values-based investing. A well-selected ESG investment option has as much of
a chance of providing positive returns as a well-selected non ESG investment option.22 It is
neither disloyal to the plan participant nor fiscally imprudent to offer a well-managed and
thoughtfully constructed ESG investment option that will both provide excellent returns for the
beneficiary and have a positive impact on global sustainability.
Second, this justification takes too narrow of a look at how fiduciaries can facilitate
retirement security for employees. It is insufficient to focus solely on risk/return of plan
participants without also encouraging employees to opt into the plan in the first place. If
millennials are choosing not to invest in their retirement plan, but are using apps like Robinhood
to direct values-based investments using other discretionary funds,23 fiduciaries can entice these
values-based millennial investors to continue to invest in sustainable business, but with taxadvantaged retirement savings and an employer match instead.24
ESG investing is particularly attractive to millennials, a generation that has been hard hit
both by increased climate change and increased retirement insecurity.25 According to recent
surveys, millennial investors are twice as likely as the general investor population to invest in
companies with ESG related goals.26 90% of millennial investors stated they want an ESG option
in their 401(k) plan.27 Many of these values-driven millennials are also not adequately saving for
retirement, and at least a small portion of them are under saving in their 401(k)s because they are

21

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2020-24515/p-36.
Madison Sargis & Patrick Wang, How Does Investing in ESG Companies Affect Returns, MORNINGSTAR (Feb. 19,
2020), https://www.morningstar.com/insights/2020/02/19/esg-companies
23
Dave Fogel, Millennials and the Robinhood Revolution, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N: AFTER THE BAR,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/after-the-bar/student-loans-andfinances/millennials-robinhood-revolution/.
24
The Tax Benefits of Your 401(k) Plan, TURBOTAX, (2020), https://turbotax.intuit.com/tax-tips/investments-andtaxes/the-tax-benefits-of-your-401k-plan/L8QHCzbiO.
25
THE DELOITTE GLOBAL MILLENNIAL SURVEY 2020 3, 7, 9-11 (2020), available at
https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/about-deloitte/articles/millennialsurvey.html; Audrey Choi, How
Younger Investors Could Reshape the World, MORGAN STANLEY: WEALTH MANAGEMENT (Jan. 24, 2018),
https://www.morganstanley.com/access/why-millennial-investors-are-different (“In 2012, 31 percent of millennials
participated in an employer-sponsored program, whether a defined benefit plan such as a pension or a defined
contribution plan such as a 401(k).4 About half of Gen Xers participated in a plan that year, while 56 percent of
baby boomers took part in one. Though traditional pensions were once the more typical way to build retirement
income, participation rates for defined benefit plans varied in a relatively narrow range, rising from 6 percent for
millennials to 13 percent for boomers. Participation rates in defined contribution plans rose more dramatically by
generation, from 25 percent for millennials to 40 percent for Gen Xers and 43 percent for boomers.”)
26
Id.
27
Id.
22
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saving in other types of investment vehicles.28 Providing a greener and cleaner ESG option in
their tax-advantaged retirement plans could redirect millennial investment dollars into 401(k)s,
encouraging millennials to save more towards retirement and facilitating ERISA’s overall goal of
ensuring retirement security for American workers.
This article argues that, if new regulations lower the burden of offering an ESG option in
a retirement plan lineup, retirement investors, particularly millennials, would likely redirect some
or all of their retirement plan assets towards a sustainable investment option. This would not only
be good for the planet, since it would direct more dollars towards companies with a sustainable
footprint and incentivize other companies to get on board, but would be good for millennial
retirement plan participants. Giving those investors a greener, cleaner retirement plan option
aligned to their millennial values might prompt more millennials and other values-driven
retirement plan investors to participate in greater numbers and invest in higher amounts in their
retirement plans. Given the power of compound interest, even a marginal change in millennial
participation in 401(k) plans as a result of increased access to ESG investing would have an
outsized impact on their economic stability in retirement.
While the 2021 Department of Labor recently announced a nonenforcement policy of the
ESG Rule, a simple non enforcement of this rule does not go far enough to encourage plan
fiduciaries to offer an ESG investment in their lineup. The Biden Administration should go
further and issue a new ESG Rule that actively encourages plan fiduciaries to offer a fiscally
responsible ESG fund in their lineup to encourage more millennial and other values-based
investor participation and contribution to their retirement savings.
It is important to note that this article does not pretend to offer an easy Labor Department
regulatory fix to all of the millennial generation’s economic hardships. ESG investing will not
somehow magically cure millennials of a debt crisis caused by ballooning costs of higher
education and a depressed job market post Great Recession and the COVID-19 pandemic. But
marginal retirement investing at a young age has enormous returns, thanks to compound interest.
And this regulatory change is a cheap and easy way to encourage a bit more saving, while also
increasing investment in sustainable businesses and encouraging companies to care about climate
change.
Plenty has been written about ERISA’s regulation of plan investments, and in the past
few years there have been strong pieces of scholarship on the role the Labor Department should
play in regulating ESG in ERISA-regulated lineups.29 This article adds to the body of scholarship
in two ways. First, it argues that ERISA and the Labor Department should actively encourage
ESG investing, and that intelligent and modern approaches to ESG investing do not run afoul of
ERISA’s duties of loyalty and prudence. Second, this article novelly suggests that lowering the
burden, or even encouraging, fiduciaries to include ESG investment options in their plan lineup
might encourage more retirement savings in general.
This article will proceed in four parts. Part I will provide background on ESG—the
history of values-based investing, changing approaches to ESG investing, and increased
individual and institutional investor appetite for ESG investment options.
28

Generational Retirement Trends Study, T. ROWE PRICE (2015), at slide 12, available at
https://www.slideshare.net/TRowePrice/generational-retirement-trends-study-2015/121212By_Worker_GenerationMajor_Reasons_for.
29
See generally Bernard Sharfman, ESG Investing Under ERISA, 38 YALE J. REG. BULLETIN 112 (2020); Max M.
Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of
ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STANFORD L. REV. 381 (2020); Susan N. Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term:
Fiduciary Duties and ESG Integration, 90 U. COLORADO L. REV. 731 (2019).
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Part II will dive into the marginal positive impacts that opening up access to retirement
plan investing in ESG could have on retirement saving in general. This section will discuss the
general retirement savings crisis in the United States, and the particular hurdles the millennial
generation faces with retirement saving. This section will posit that allowing employees to invest
their retirement savings into ESG funds could, on the margin, increase retirement savings, which
for young employees could have a large financial impact thanks to compound interest.
Part III will examine the relationship between ERISA, the Department of Labor, and ESG
investing. This Part will discuss how ESG investing fits into ERISA’s regulation of fiduciaries,
and suggest how fiduciaries could include ESG options in their lineups without running afoul of
their fiduciary duties.
Finally, Part IV will lay out recommendations to the incoming Biden Administration for
how they can revise the Financial Factors rule to lower the burden, or even encourage, ERISAregulated fiduciaries to include an ESG option in their retirement plan investment lineup.
I.

A HISTORY OF ESG
A. Defining ESG

What is colloquially referred to today as “ESG investing” has a number of different
names. Some people refer to this type of investing as values-based investing, or responsible
investing, or sustainable investing. In the past it was referred to as “socially responsible
investing.” These different names all have the same core strategy—to consider facts that
traditionally were not part of a classic financial analysis process, yet have broader relevance to
the impact of a company on the environment. Many investors believe, and many studies have
shown, that while these factors may not have been traditionally considered as part of the
investment valuation process, they have significant financial relevance to the performance of the
company. They may include how companies are responding to climate change, the size of their
“carbon footprint”, how their health and safety policies work to protect their employees, how
they treat workers more generally, or whether their corporate culture builds trust and spurs
innovation.30
While evidence of values-based investing can be traced back as early as the 1700s,31 this
type of investing strategy took hold in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s in response to
the Vietnam War and apartheid in South Africa. Back then, this type of values-based investing
was coined “socially responsible investing”, or SRI.32 Activists called for boycotts and

30

E. Napoletano & Benjamin Curry, Environmental, Social and Governance: What is ESG Investing?, FORBES:
ADVISOR (Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgkell/2018/07/11/the-remarkable-rise-ofesg/?sh=19865b3d1695.
31
The founder of the Methodist Church, John Wesley, warned his followers not to profit off of harmful business
practices, such as alcohol, the slave trade, and the production of dangerous chemicals. Max Schanzenbach & Robert
H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a
Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381, 392 (2020).
32
E. Napoletano & Benjamin Curry, Environmental, Social and Governance: What is ESG Investing?, FORBES:
ADVISOR (Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgkell/2018/07/11/the-remarkable-rise-ofesg/?sh=19865b3d1695.
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divestment from companies doing business in South Africa, or from companies who did not
promise to abide by certain nondiscrimination principles in their South African operations.33
Values-based investment strategies and marketing has shifted since the 1970s. In addition
to incorporating a company’s environmental and social impact into the valuation process,
modern ESG investors also incorporate corporate governance structure into their investment
strategies (the “G” in ESG.) In addition, these values-based funds now seek to allure investors
through the superior investment returns, in addition to their ethical benefits, as the funds may
have less exposure to long-term risks by avoiding certain ESG red flags.34
The modern term “ESG” was first used in a 2005 research study titled, ‘Who Cares
Wins,”35 authored by twenty financial institutions from nine countries with total assets under
managements of over $6 trillion.36 The report argued there was a direct connection between the
way companies manage their environmental, social, and corporate governance issues and their
overall management qualities.37 In addition, the report argued that companies with high E, S, and
G performance increase shareholder value, by “properly managing risks, anticipating regulatory
action or accessing new markets, while at the same time contributing to the sustainable
development of the societies in which they operate. Moreover, these issues can have a strong
impact on reputation and brands, an increasingly important part of company value.”38 The report
recommended that investment analysts and financial institutions incorporate ESG factors into
their research and investment processes to help better value companies and contribute towards
more stable and sustainable financial markets.39
B. ESG Investing
Individuals today have many different opportunities to invest in ESG. Research firms
evaluate companies for their corporate governance structure and their environmental and social
impact and give an ESG or green designation to companies meeting certain requirements.
Additionally, investment companies offer ESG funds that invest in ESG-friendly companies, and
individuals can buy into these funds just as they can buy into a mutual fund or exchange-traded
fund (ETF).40 Individuals can either invest directly in ESG-friendly companies or in ESGfriendly investment vehicles like a mutual fund or an ETF.41 They can invest their discretionary
dollars in a taxable brokerage account, through brokers such as Fidelity or Robinhood, or they
can allocate portions of a retirement account, like an IRA, towards those companies or funds. In
theory, if an employer provided an ESG option, employees could also direct their 401(k) dollars
into an ESG fund, much as employees can currently direct those funds into a suite of non-ESG
investment options.
33

Max Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and
Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381, 392 (2020).
34
Id.
35
UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, WHO CARES WINS (2004), available at
https://d306pr3pise04h.cloudfront.net/docs/issues_doc%2FFinancial_markets%2Fwho_cares_who_wins.pdf.
36
Id. at i.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. at ii, v
40
Jeff Reeves, 7 Socially Responsible ETFs to Buy Now, U.S. NEWS (June 17, 2020),
https://money.usnews.com/investing/funds/slideshows/socially-responsible-etfs-to-buy-now.
41
Debbie Carlson, How to Invest In Green Stocks, U.S. NEWS (May 28, 2020),
https://money.usnews.com/investing/investing-101/articles/how-to-invest-in-green-stocks.
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ESG funds and ESG managers use different types of portfolio construction tools and
strategies to build fiscally and socially responsible investment products. Except for passive ESG
indexes (discussed below), most ESG funds are actively-managed funds that use ESG
information as a part of their investment strategy. All actively managed funds use a specific
strategy in their attempt to “beat the index,” or product risk-adjusted returns.42 Some of those
strategies might include being overweight in growth sectors or looking for a specific amount of
leverage or debt to capital ratio. Active ESG funds use ESG metrics to attempt to come to a
deeper understanding of a company’s value and beat a benchmark to produce outsized returns.
Recent research by JP Morgan Chase concluded there is a significant value-add to considering
ESG factors as part of active portfolio management and demonstrates “that the boost in alpha
[returns] arises from ESG’s risk mitigant nature…[and] carr[ies] significantly lower credit risk
relative to the ‘Pure Value’ [non ESG] strategy.”43
A group of financial industry leaders working with the Investment Company Institute
classified three different methods of ESG investing.44 The first method of ESG investing is “ESG
exclusionary,” which is the most similar to the passive screening tactics used in the past.45 These
types of funds simply eliminate companies based on a specific value. For example, Nuveen’s
ESG Mid-Cap Growth ETF is a broad asset allocation fund that screens out fossil fuel
companies, while still maintaining traditional broad market exposure.46 Another example of an
ESG friendly ETF that maintains broad exposure while screening out fossil fuels is State Street's
SPDR S&P 500 Fossil Fuel Free ETF, which mimics the S&P 500 but screens out fossil fuel
companies.47 Similar ESG funds and indexes exist where the manager just screens out tobacco
companies.48
Funds using ESG exclusionary strategies can be active or passive funds—fund managers
can choose either to simply mimic an existing index, but exclude certain companies for “bad”
ESG practices,49 or funds can be actively managed using a proprietary investment strategies, yet
refuse to include certain companies with “bad” ESG practices.
The second and third type of ESG investing, called “ESG inclusionary” and “impact
investing,” both take an active investment approach.50 Morningstar, a highly regarded
independent investment research company, described this active approach to ESG investing as

42

Active Management, CORPORATE FINANCIAL INSTITUTE,
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/trading-investing/active-management/.
43
SHIVAM GHOSH, J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., VIRTUE ISN’T THE ONLY REWARD 1 (15 March 2020). On file with
the author, Courtesy J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Copyright 2021.
44
INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, FUNDS USE OF ESG INTEGRATION AND SUSTAINABLE INVESTING STRATEGIES:
AN INTRODUCTION 3 (2020), https://www.ici.org/pdf/20_ppr_esg_integration.pdf.
45
Id. at 5
46
Lara Crigger, Dirtiest & Cleanest ESG Funds, ETF.COM (June 30, 2020), https://www.etf.com/sections/featuresand-news/dirtiest-cleanest-esg-funds?nopaging=1
47
Max Chen, Investors are Re-Evaluating the Future of Fossil Fuel, Energy, ETF TRENDS: ESG CHANNEL (Dec. 11,
2020), https://www.etftrends.com/esg-channel/investors-are-re-evaluating-the-future-of-fossil-fuel-energy/.
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a risk-management process, as companies that embrace sustainable practices are
managing liabilities better than others, perhaps recognizing new opportunities, and may
be better positioned to grow in the future. Environmental, social, and governance
investing has evolved from funds that simply screened out undesirable companies like
polluters or sellers of tobacco to strategies that apply a matrix of sophisticated screens to
assess the best and worst players in every industry and actively seek to have a positive
impact in many ways.51
Both ESG inclusionary and impact investing strategies use ESG information to select
which companies to include in a portfolio. A portfolio using an ESG inclusionary strategy might
diversify its holding across sectors and choose to include companies with higher relative ESG
scores as compared to peer companies in that same industry. A fund using the impact investing
strategy would have its investment analysts pick high quality companies with high ESG scores in
a specific value of interest, to build a “green” fund or a “gender diversity” fund. Both of these
strategies use active investing rather than passive screening, as analysts are actively reviewing
and investigating a company’s overall structure and value, and include high quality companies
that also score well on the specific desired ESG metric. This is different from a passive screening
strategy, where a fund will simply mimic another fund or index, but screen out “bad” ESG
companies.
One example of an ESG investment advisor that uses active asset management research
to pick companies that are predicted to perform well overall and have a positive ESG global
impact is the newly launched Humankind Investments. This investment advisor has an actively
managed ESG ETF that, like many of the other actively managed ESG funds, uses the same sort
of valuation tactics as other non-ESG funds, but simply weighs the ESG classifications higher
than a non ESG fund might otherwise.
Humankind’s analysts use a variety of factors, including ESG and traditional financial
metrics, to calculate a Humankind Value score, and invests in companies with high scores on this
metric. The founder, James Katz, explained the logic behind the process as reflective of his belief
“that traditional investment analysis, with its typically narrow focus on standalone financial
performance, fails to fully capture a company’s ability to remain sustainable and competitive in
the long run.”52 Humankind acknowledges they are not looking only to invest in companies that
are perfect on all possible ESG factors and that they are just looking to include companies that
add more positive impact on the world than negative.53 This approach of looking at the overall
ESG picture and the company's overall ESG global impact is a strategy that is common across
active ESG investors.
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C. ESG Performance
A persistent, but untrue, stereotype about ESG investing that has likely contributed to the
Labor Department’s strict regulation on ESG investing, is that ESG investments have poor
returns compared to non-ESG investments.54 This claim may come from outdated understandings
of what ESG investing looks like (pure screening mechanism versus an active process as detailed
above) or from a political agenda seeking to discourage investment in sustainable or green
businesses. No matter its generation or motivation, broad brushing ESG investing as
irresponsible investing is simply untrue.
Scores of studies and years of research have shown no increased risk in investing in ESG
versus traditional non-ESG funds, and, in fact, some recent studies and interviews with
investment analysts have suggested there is less risk in investing in ESG versus non ESG funds.
A 2020 Morningstar study showed there was no greater investment risk to investing in ESG,
rather than non-ESG, on a global level.55 A 2019 study found that a high ESG portfolio
outperformed a comparable low ESG portfolio by 16 basis points per year.56 A 2015 study
examined over 2,000 studies of ESG performance and found that, in 90% of the studies, there
was no negative relationship between concern for social factors and corporate financial
performance.57 And, a large majority of the studies found a stable and positive relationship
between ESG factors and corporate financial performance.58 This positive correlation between
ESG scores and financial performance makes sense—the factors underlying high ESG ratings
also help to drive value, by lowering risks of worker safety incidents, pollution spills, litigation,
and other public relations disasters that can damage a company’s brand and valuation.59
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Incorporating ESG analysis is now considered by the financial industry to be an
important part of responsible portfolio construction.60 A recent research report from J.P. Morgan
Chase tested this theory, tracking the performance of funds constrained to only the “top rated
ESG issuers,” and found this type of ESG constraint “not only improves the ESG profile of a
portfolio but also boosts alpha [return].”61 The report concluded that “for an active manager
following a Value-like strategy, ESG constraints can increase returns and improve risk adjusted
performance.”62
Unsurprisingly, many actively managed ESG funds outperform other types of actively
managed funds. This outperformance makes sense when you understand the value-add of ESG
factor analysis to an analyst’s understanding of a company’s ESG-related risk exposure. For
example, Vanguard’s FTSE Social Index Fund saw outsized returns over one year (18.3%,) three
years (10%,) and five years (14.4%.)63 This performance beat out 98% of non-ESG funds
holding stock in large companies with similar growth and value characteristics.64
The anti-ESG advocates arguing that it is fiscally irresponsible to invest retirement plan
assets in ESG funds are out-of-step with what the financial industry has determined is the best
step for increased returns.
As mentioned above, one reason why this negative, yet untrue, perception of ESG
investing continues to circulate even in highly educated circles is because of an outdated
understanding of what ESG investing entails. Critics point to some ESG investors’ tendencies to
screen out companies based on non-ESG friendly factors, such as companies that issue dual-class
shares (a “no no” for ESG investors particularly concerned about governance issues.) Bernard S.
Sharfman recently made the claim in the Yale Journal on Regulation Bulletin that ESG investing
is irresponsible because it screens out companies with bad “G” ratings, like Alphabet or Zoom,
making the fund inherently underperform the broader market. 65 The argument is that, if ESG
funds are excluding companies with dual-class shares, they are inherently screening out some of
the most successful and high performing equities from companies like Alphabet, Zoom, and
Facebook, all of which issue multiple classes of shares.
This way of describing ESG investing is misleading for many reasons, mostly because it
mis-characterizes what ESG investing actually is. As discussed above, much of ESG investing
today does not use the automatic ESG exclusionary strategy criticized by some anti-ESG
advocates. So, the criticism that ESG investing is inherently irresponsible because it screens out
high performers doesn’t even apply to a huge swath of the ESG market.
And, in many cases, using the ESG exclusionary strategy criticized by Sharfman and
others actually produces the opposite of what critics claim it does. In many instances, excluding
companies with “bad” ESG metrics can cause outperformance, as described above, rather than
underperformance, exactly because the screened-out characteristics make those “bad” companies
higher risk or poor investments. For example, many fossil-fuel exclusionary ESG funds have

SHIVAM GHOSH, J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., VIRTUE ISN’T THE ONLY REWARD 1 (15 March 2020). On file with
the author, Courtesy J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Copyright 2021.
61
Id. at 2.
62
Id. at 1.
63
Nellie S. Huang, 6 Vanguard Funds That Are Socially Responsible, KIPLINGER (April 26, 2017)
https://www.kiplinger.com/slideshow/investing/t041-s003-6-vanguard-funds-that-are-sociallyresponsible/index.html.
64
Id.
65
Bernard S. Sharfman, ESG Investing Under ERISA, 38 YALE J. ON REGULATION BULLETIN 112,121-122 (2020).
60

10

outperformed other non ESG indexes because they screen out these high-risk fossil fuel
companies that have underperformed in the past years.66
Evidence suggests that ESG funds, whether actively managed or exclusionary,
specifically outperform in economic downturns,67 as they are better insulated against downside
risks. This type of outperformance makes sense because ESG factors align with many of the risks
that may hurt a company during a downturn.68 But whether ESG funds only outperform in a
down market, outperform in all markets, or simply provide similar returns to non-ESG
investments,69 it's illogical to treat these types of investments any differently than other kinds of
investments, given their similar, or in certain cases more favorable, returns to investors.
D. Demand for ESG
ESG investing has become extremely popular, both among individual and institutional
investors. ESG’s popularity is due to two factors. The first, of course, is the nature of ESG as
valued-based. ESG’s global value proposition speaks to all values-based investors, and
specifically to millennials, who are overrepresented in the recent growth in demand for ESG
investment products. Between 2015 and 2019, interest in sustainable investing jumped from 71%
to 85% in the general population of investors, but from 84% to 95% in millennial investors.70 A
2019 Ernst & Young report found that “demand for sustainable investments is being driven, in
part, by millennials who prefer to investment in alignment with personal values.”71

66

Now You Can Compare Fossil Free Funds to Index Funds, Fossil Free Funds (May 20, 2020),
https://fossilfreefunds.org/blog/2020/05/20/now-you-can-compare-fossil-free-funds-to-index-funds.html (“Over the
past 12 months, again the basic S&P 500 fund is lowest (+0.83), the Parnassus fund is next (+1.58), and the “fossil
fuel reserves free” is outperforming (+1.99).”); Jeff Benjamin, As Pandemic Rages On, ESG Funds Shine Brightly,
INVESTMENTNEWS (April 19, 2020), https://www.investmentnews.com/as-pandemic-rages-on-esg-funds-shinebrightly-191673 (“Part of the strength of ESG strategies in the current downturn can be attributed to the fact that
most ESG funds have limited exposure to the fossil fuel industries, which have suffered so far this year.”)
67
Id.
68
Tom Lauricella, Jess Liu, Sustainable Funds Weather Downturns Better Than Peers, MORNINGSTAR (Jun. 15,
2020), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/988114/sustainable-funds-weather-downturns-better-than-peers
(“...evidence continues to build that ESG funds provide less downside risk than do their traditional peers. Investing
in sustainable strategies has the potential to offer investors beneficial portfolio risk attributes and downside
cushioning over short- and long-term time horizons. Add in the long-run benefits of investing in companies better
poised to navigate risks poised by climate change or highlighted by the COVID-19 pandemic, and the ESG story is
becoming more compelling.”)
69
Russel Kinnel, How Vanguard, Fidelity, and Others Embrace ESG Investing, MORNINGSTAR (Jun 2, 2020),
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/986785/how-vanguard-fidelity-and-others-embrace-esg-investing (“Will ESG
Investing Improve My Performance? The answer is to be determined. When I’ve looked at the data, it always shows
that ESG funds collectively have average performance. Or, to put it another way, an ESG focus doesn’t help as
much as its biggest cheerleaders say, nor does it hurt as much as its critics say. To me, that makes sense. A
sustainable focus ought to be a positive, but on the other hand, many low-ESG companies like tobacco or oil trade at
very low valuations because of those liabilities. Perhaps that cheapness will be sufficient to compensate investors for
taking on those risks. However, as I mentioned, ESG has evolved significantly in approach and in terms of the firms
managing those strategies. So, even if the past data showed a more meaningful performance pattern, I’d be wary of
projecting that into the future.”)
70
MSCI, SWIPE TO INVEST: THE STORY BEHIND MILLENNIALS AND ESG INVESTING 3 (March 2020),
https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/07e7a7d3-59c3-4d0b-b0b5029e8fd3974b#:~:text=%E2%80%9CDemand%20for%20sustainable%20investments%20is,management%20clients
%20at%20Ernst%20%26%20Young.
71
Id.

11

The second factor leading to the increase in demand for ESG products, especially more
recently, is the continued high performance of ESG funds, due to their inclusion of additional
risk factors into the traditional financial analysis. Individual investors and analysts and managers
at institutional investment shops are citing performance as their main driver of ESG investing.72
ESG investing truly is both good for the planet and for our portfolios.
Individual investors, who are among the millennial population and the general investor
population, are increasingly turning to sustainable investing as a way to align their investment
decisions with their values, while making good returns in the process. A 2017 study from
Nuveen showed that 4 out of 5 investors “want their investments to make a positive impact on
society and on environmental sustainability.”73
These individual investors are not naive, nor are they subjugating returns to their values.
A recent study on individual investors reported that a majority of investors cited performance as
their main motivation for investing in these types of responsible investments.74 53% cited “better
performance” and 46% cited “aligns with my values.”75 ESG investments offer investors a rare
opportunity to marry their values with increased financial returns. Institutional investors are also
recognizing the financial benefits of investing in ESG, and many even incorporate ESG analysis
into their non-ESG funds.76
Despite all of this institutional and individual investor interest in ESG investments,
401(k) plans are woefully behind when it comes to offering ESG options for their retirement
investors. While one-third of all professional managed assets are invested in funds using ESG
strategies (a total of $17 trillion),77 and $1.7 trillion are invested directly in ESG funds,78 these
are almost exclusively held in non-ERISA regulated [definitionally non-401(k) accounts].79 Just
3% of employers offer an ESG option in their 401(k) lineup and only 0.1% of overall 401(k)
assets (less than $9 billion) are currently invested in an ESG fund.
But this discrepancy between the percent of retirement assets invested in ESG and the
percent of overall assets in ESG is not due to lack of investor interest—it is due to the high
regulatory burden placed on fiduciaries of retirement plan funds. This article posits that, if that
barrier were lowered, retirement plan assets would shift towards sustainable investments,
increasing the overall total of assets invested in sustainable business.
This change would be good for the planet, since it rewards ESG-friendly options and
incentivizes other companies to follow suit, and is good for retirement plan participants, since
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they can direct their assets towards funds they believe in, and trust they will have as good, if not
better, returns down the line.

II.

THE RETIREMENT CRISIS, AND WHAT ESG CAN DO ABOUT IT

The extent of the retirement crisis facing Americans is well-documented and wellknown. The typical (median) American worker has $0 saved for retirement.81 40% of
Americans have a retirement savings account, but the median amount saved is only $40,000,
while the recommended savings target is six times current income at age 50.82 Americans are
well-aware of their own retirement insecurity -- 65% are convinced they will have to work past
the normal retirement age in order to afford to retire83 and 51% predict tthey will be unable to
maintain their current standard of living in retirement.84
Congress has attempted to address this retirement crisis over the past two decades. with
major retirement-specific legislation, like the Pension Protection Act85 and the SECURE Act.86
Congress has also tried incremental changes to encourage more retirement savings, such as
creating new forms of retirement accounts such as Roth IRAs or creating other tax-advantaged
savings vehicles like health savings accounts.87 But the retirement crisis still persists.
More action is needed to encourage more people to save for retirement. Allowing
employees to invest their retirement dollars in value-based investment vehicles may encourage
additional retirement savings, especially for younger workers, as it would allow them to align
their retirement savings with their personal values. This could be achieved by a simple regulatory
change at the agency level and would not require the expensive and protracted wrangling and
politicking that comes with large-scale Congressional action.
80
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A. Millennial Retirement Insecurity
Retirement insecurity is especially heightened among millennials. 77% of millennials
fear they'll either never retire or will have to work far past the normal retirement age, as
compared to 36% of Gen Xers and 29% of baby boomers.88 A research study by Aon Hewitt
determined that millennials are at the highest risk of retirement insecurity compared to older
generations, and predicted that eight out of ten millennials will not be able to meet their financial
needs in retirement without significant changes in their saving and investing behaviors.89
Ninety-five percent of working millennials have insufficient retirement savings.90 Twothirds of working millennials, or 54.9 million young Americans, have no retirement savings at
all.91 Among those millennials who are saving for retirement, most are still vastly under saving.
The median account balance in millennial retirement accounts is $19,100.92 Some financial
professionals suggest this generation should save between $1.8 to $2.2. million for retirement, or
between 15-22% of their annual income.93 Yet currently, the 85% millennials who have
retirement savings are saving less than 6%, with an average employee retirement savings rate of
5%.94 This lack of savings is especially shocking given that 60% of surveyed millennial investors
agreed with the statement ““I expect Social Security to go bankrupt before I retire” (as compared
to 47% of overall workers.)95
One of the main reasons millennials are woefully underprepared for their financial needs
in retirement is because of the outsized impact the shift from defined-benefit to definedcontribution plans has had on this generation. Defined-benefit plans have all but disappeared,
especially for millennial workers, and employers have recplaed this retirement benefit with
401(k) type plans.96 401(k) plans may be better from an employer-persepctive, but from an
employee persepctive, they make retirement security much less secure. While many employers
offer an employer match where they contribute towards the employee’s 401(k) type plan, this
match is nothing like the defined benefit pension plans of the past.
In a defined benefit plan, the employer bears most of the market risk and has the burden
of ensuring that the pension is adequately funded and manages to provide adequate retirement
income for the employees. In a 401(k)-type plan, the employee bears that risk. Unlike with a
traditional defined benefit pension plan, workers with 401(k) type plans do not have any
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guaranteed retirement savings—they bear the responsibility and risk of participating in the plan,
contributing to the plan, and managing the plan.
The shift from employer-sponsored defined benefit plans (traditional pensions) to
employer-sponsored defined contribution plans (401(k) like plans)97 shifts the burden of who is
responsible for ensuring the employee’s retirement security. Traditional defined benefit pension
plans are maintained by employers and contributed to by employers. Employees are not able to
touch the retirement savings accruing in the pension plan until a specified retirement date. In a
traditional defined benefit pension plan, employers hold the risk and liability for maintaining
income for their employees in retirement. These plans guarantee employees a steady stream of
income throughout retirement, typically determined based on average wages earned at a
specified time prior to retirement. Traditional defined benefit pension plans are structured so that
retirement benefits typically come close to replacing pre-retirement wages.98
401(k) type plans, on the other hand, place the burden of savings and investing those
savings on the employee. The most common type of investment option in a 401(k) plan is a
mutual fund or similar type of fund that pools participants’ assets and is managed by a
professional fund manager. The menu of investment options for employees is created by the
employer, often with the help of plan service providers. There is usually a range of options (with
an average of 14)99 and employees can choose which option or options they would like to invest
part or all of their retirement plan assets in. Requiring employees to manage their retirement
savings is less desirable than the professionally managed defined benefit plan structure for many
reasons, including that Americans are on average financially illiterate and lack basic knowledge
required to make investment decisions.100
While the shift from traditional defined benefit pension plan to 401(k) type plans was
detrimental to all employees, it has had a disproportionately detrimental impact on the newest
generation of workers. These Millennial workers have found themselves on the losing end of
two-tiered wage and benefit agreements, where companies continue pension benefits for older
workers, while phasing them out for younger workers. Millennials almost exclusively have
defined contribution plans instead of defined benefit plans.101
Millennial workers are also disproportionately affected by the self-directed nature of a
401(k) plan versus the employer managed nature of a traditional defined benefit pension plan.
Millennials have the lowest rates of participation in 401(k) type plans compared to older
generations of workers. Studies from both 2011 and 2018 showed that only half of millennials
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eligible to participate in a defined contribution plan did so.102 And even those millennials who
are participating in their 401(k) type plans are not saving enough.
B. ESG As a Marginal Savings Nudge
Employers seeking to increase participation in and contribution to an employersponsored, participant directed retirement savings plan should consider offering an ESG option
in their investment lineup as a way to nudge more employees to save more dollars in these types
of accounts. This could be particularly impactful for millennial workers, who are particularly
interested in values-based investing.
Studies have shown that millennials consider companies’ global impact before buying
their product or investing in their business, and that millennials seek to tailor their investments to
their values.103 The financial industry recognizes the importance of ESG considerations to
millennials, and uses ESG as a strategy to attract millennial investors.104 Employers should do
the same and entice more millennial employees to participate in and save more in their
retirement plans by offering millennial-friendly ESG investment options.
To be clear, this is not a band aid that can solve all millennial economic woes. Offering
an ESG option in the investment plan lineup will likely not encourage millennials who simply
have no funds to invest to start investing in their 401(k). Millennials face record levels of student
debt,105 and, in some cases, it makes financial sense to use income to pay down student debt
before saving for retirement.106 Millennials may also be saving for a down payment, or using
their income on childcare, the costs of which have both increased at a record pace. For millennial
workers who simply have no discretionary dollars to invest after paying or saving for basic
necessities and financing existing debt, opting out of a 401(k) may be the most financially savvy
decision. But that is not all millennials.
Many millennial workers do have discretionary dollars left after they meet their basic
needs each month, and it is these millennials who may save more if offered an ESG option. Only
39% of millennial workers who are eligible but do not participate in their 401(k) plans stated
they have trouble meeting monthly expenses. Many millennials who opt out or under utilize their
102
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401(k)s are simply saving elsewhere, likely in retail investment apps popular among millennials,
like Robinhood.107 For example, 8% of millennials eligible for 401(k)s but not participating in
the 401(k) stated they don’t participate because they are saving through other vehicles.108
Additionally, 15% of millennials who are saving less than the maximum amount in their 401(k)
stated they are under-saving in their 401(k) because they are using other investment vehicles.109
These investment-savvy but non- or under- 401(k) participating millennials are the ones who
could be enticed to save more for retirement if the 401(k) investment lineup spoke more to their
investment values.
Millennial behavior on individual investment platforms such as Robinhood underscore
this interest and also the fact that Millenials will indeed invest if the opportunity is a good match
for their values. Robinhood’s investor base is overwhelmingly millennial, with the average
investor age of 31. And what these millennial investors are chasing through Robinhood is the
trend of investing in clean energy.110 But the disadvantage to using a Robinhood account to
invest in sustainable companies is that in Robinhood investments are less tax-advantaged than
401(k) investments, and there is no potential employer match for Robinhood “contributions.”111
If an employer offered a sustainable, environmentally friendly ESG fund within the taxadvantaged employer-sponsored retirement plan, especially if the company were matching
employee contributions, it seems likely to redirect millennial savings away from tax-inefficient
platforms like Robinhood and towards tax-efficient savings vehicles like 401(k)s. Not only
would this provision of an ESG fund offer better returns and less investment risk for retirement
plan assets,112 but it would encourage greater millennial participation in and contribution to the
plan in the first place.
Allowing employees to invest their 401(k) funds in a well-selected ESG investment
option is not the be-all-end-all solution to millennial retirement woes. But it could encourage
millennial workers, at the margin, to increase their retirement savings, at very little or no cost.
And with the enormous impact that compound interest has on the value of dollars invested early
in one’s career, that marginal early investments could have an outsized impact on millennial
retirement security.
III.

ERISA REGULATION OF ESG INVESTING

There is clear and overwhelming individual and institutional interest for ESG investing,
and including ESG funds in 401(k) lineups could have a marginal, yet significant, impact on
increased economic security for millennials in retirement. The current regulatory framework for
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ESG investments, however, makes it difficult for Americans to invest their employer-sponsored
retirement accounts in ESG funds.
Limiting ESG access for retirement plan assets not only keeps the trillions of dollars in
401(k) assets out of the sustainable market,113 but it also limits the extent to which many
Americans can even access ESG. More than 20 percent of American households’ only form of
investment ownership is an employer-sponsored retirement account.114 Lowering the regulatory
barriers to investing retirement funds in ESG will increase access to and investment in ESGs and
could simultaneously encourage increased retirement savings.
Before delving into the history of ERISA and its subsequent regulations curtailing the
inclusion of ESG options in ERISA-regulated investment plan lineups, I describe the regulatory
framework, as it stands under the current rule, Financial Factors for Selecting Plan Investments
(the “ESG Rule”.) Although the Department of Labor announced in March 2021 that it would
not be enforcing this rule, this is still the current rule that individual litigants can sue under if
they believe they suffered losses to their plan because of the fiduciaries’ decision to include an
ESG option.
Furthermore, even if the Financial Factors rule is likely to be replaced by a more proESG Rule in the next few years under the 2021 Department of Labor, the Financial Factors rule
still sets the standard for how a retirement plan provider must act if they wish to include an ESG
option today.
A. Trump’s anti-ESG Rule
While the ESG Rule was not issued in its final form nor published until late 2020, the
Trump Labor Department made it clear early that they would be taking a critical eye to ESG
investing of retirement plan assets. A Field-Assistance Bulletin issued in 2018 warned that
“fiduciaries must not too readily treat ESG factors as economically relevant to the particular
investment.”115 The Department reiterated this lukewarm stance on ESG when issuing the ESG
rule in 2020, warning that “private employer-sponsored retirement plans are not for furthering
social goals or policy objectives but rather to provide for retirement security of workers.”116 The
final rule did not explicitly ban ESG investments in retirement plan lineups. Instead, it laid out a
complex process that fiduciaries needed to follow to ensure they did not violate their fiduciary
duties by offering an ESG fund.117
The rule colloquially known as “the ESG Rule” doesn’t even use the term ESG in the text
of the rule (although it is all over the preamble.) Instead, the Labor Department’s rule regulates
the use of ESG funds by ERISA regulated fiduciaries through an opaque word—“pecuniary.”
113
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The rule lays out the types of factors that are permissible for fiduciaries to consider when
choosing plan investments, namely “pecuniary” factors, and those that are impossible for
fiduciaries to consider, namely “non-pecuniary” factors. The rule defines “pecuniary” as “a
factor that a fiduciary prudently determined is expected to have a material effect on the risk
and/or return of an investment based on appropriate investment horizons consistent with the
plan’s investment objectives.”118
The regulation sets forth two exceptions to the pecuniary factors requirement. First, a
fiduciary can choose plans that “promote, seek, or support non-pecuniary goals” as long as the
investment choice can be justified solely on the basis of pecuniary factors.119 The second
exception is that a fiduciary can choose a plan based on non-pecuniary factors, as long as they
can pass the “tie breaker test.”120
In the first exception, a fiduciary who wants to include a plan that considered nonpecuniary (maybe ESG) factors can do so, as long as the fiduciary justifies the inclusion of this
plan based solely on pecuniary (materially relevant economic) factors.
Of course, an employer who wanted to include an ESG option in their lineup could do
this. The premise of this entire paper is that many ESG funds do rely on ESG as a clearly
pecuniary, or economically relevant factor. But the fact that the rule requires fiduciaries to
document this pecuniary benefit upfront,121 rather than simply presuming that ESG
considerations are pecuniary, and therefore economically relevant to the investment, is the crux
of the problem with this regulation. It presumes that ESG factors are not pecuniary, or
economically relevant, and therefore requires the fiduciaries to carry the burden of proving that
they are, up front, before any beneficiary even complains about potential losses down the line.
In the case where a fiduciary either concedes that ESG factors are not pecuniary or does
not want to go through the steps of proving they are pecuniary, the rule sets out another avenue a
fiduciary can take to include an ESG investment in the lineup. The rule allows fiduciaries to use
an exception known as the “tie breaker” exception, which traditionally was used when there was
a tie between two exact investment options, so you can use non-pecuniary factors to “break the
tie.”122 Here, fiduciaries are allowed to consider non-pecuniary factors, such as some ESG
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factors but only if the fiduciary again follows a lengthy documentation process upfront,
justifying the consideration of these socially desirable but non-pecuniary factors.123
Requiring that documentation process upfront raises the same issue and question as the
first exception—why are fiduciaries required to document the necessity or inherent value-add of
looking to ESG factors when considering the value of an investment option? Why is there a
higher burden upfront on funds using an ESG investing strategy versus any other type of
proprietary active management strategy?
To reiterate, the Trump ESG Rule does not ban ESG options in retirement plans. The rule
explicitly states in the preamble, “nothing in the final rule precludes a fiduciary from looking
into certain types of investment alternatives in light of participant demand for those types of
investments….”124 It does, however, caution fiduciaries against ESG funds, warning fiduciaries
that they should not “too hastily conclud[e] that ESG funds may be selected based on pecuniary
factors or [under the “tie-breaker” rule] are not distinguishable based on pecuniary factors.”125
This regulation sets up walls of red tape, increasing the cost, burden, and litigation risk of
offering an ESG option.
The Department of Labor’s lukewarm stance on ESG investing of ERISA-regulated plan
assets is one of the main reasons for, if not the main reason for, the lack of access to ESG
investing in retirement plan lineups. As of 2019, 3% of 401(k) plans offer an ESG fund in their
investment lineup.126 The reason why that percentage is so low is because of the enormous
burden fiduciaries face when seeking to include those funds in their plans, and the inherent risk
of litigation to plans that offer them. The rule raises compliance costs and raises litigation risk
for employers seeking to provide ESG options in their lineup, and it is understandable, given the
enormous cost of ERISA litigation, why most employers chose to avoid the risk altogether.
As a result of the Trump ESG Rule’s requirement that fiduciaries either justify ESG
factors as pecuniary upfront, or go through the steps of the tie breaker, there are high compliance
costs, and as a result, few employers offer ESG options in their lineups. Employers and their
fiduciaries may feel the need to hire third party investment managers or plan consultants127 to
help them navigate the process of justifying including an ESG option, or to shield or offset
liability in a potential ERISA suit down the line.128 Other companies who cannot afford to hire
these types of third-party advisors may simply choose not to include an ESG option.
This high burden and large compliance costs explain the massive discrepancy between
non-retirement assets invested in funds using ESG investment strategies (1/3 of all professional
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managed assets)129 versus retirement assets invested in ESG (less than 0.1% of 401(k) assets.)130
It is not that employees don’t want to invest in ESG, it’s that employees do not have access to
ESG.
This scarcity may be dissuading certain employees from participating in and contributing
to their retirement plans. This negative impact on retirement savings behavior goes directly
against the purpose of ERISA and the intent behind its strict regulation of plan fiduciaries.
To better understand why the 2021 Department of Labor not only can allow ESG options
in retirement plans, but should encourage the inclusion of these options, this article will next
discuss the context and goals of ERISA. A more fulsome understanding of the history of ERISA
and the intention and operation of its strict fiduciary duties will help the reader understand why
including ESG options in retirement plan lineups is directly in line with ERISA’s intended goal
of ensuring retirement security for American workers.
B. Background to ERISA
Most employer-sponsored retirement plans are regulated under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The provisions of ERISA that regulate retirement plans
are administered by the U.S. Department of Labor.131 ERISA was passed as the culmination of
decades of legislative and activist efforts to address the retirement savings crisis in the United
States and a long history of mismanagement of pension funds.132
One of the key turning points in the pension crisis that led to ERISA’s adoption into law
was the very public meltdown of the Studebaker automobile plant, which closed in 1963.133 At
the time the plant closed, it had over 10,000 employees enrolled in their pension plan.134 Four
thousand of those ended up receiving only 15 cents on each dollar they were owed, and 2,900
received nothing.135 In the years following that plant closure and few more disastrous pension
plan failures, NBC recorded and aired interviews of individuals who had lost their retirement
savings and economic security due to mismanagement of their pension plans.136 This exposure
led to a public outcry, and the passing of ERISA.137
When ERISA was first passed, its goal was simple—to ensure employees’ economic
security in retirement.138 ERISA attempts to strike a balance between sufficient regulation to
ensure retirement plan assets are secure, and not too much regulation that would dissuade
employers from providing retirement plans to begin with. As such, ERISA does not mandate
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that all companies must provide specific benefit plans, such as retirement plans. But ERISA does
mandate that if an employer provides certain types of benefit plans, the plans must comply with
ERISA standards.139
The employers who sponsor these plans, and any fiduciary providing investment services
or management of these plans, are held to ERISA’s strict fiduciary duties to serve the interest of
plan participants. Plan participants can sue employer sponsors or fiduciaries for breach of
fiduciary duty. The penalties for breach of fiduciary duty can be astronomical, and ERISA allows
for fiduciaries to be held personally liable—so fiduciaries can be personally responsible for
making beneficiaries whole for whatever they lost as a result of the fiduciary’s
mismanagement.140 As such, companies and fiduciaries take extreme precaution to avoid any
hint of fiduciary breach when it comes to ERISA-regulated plans.
ERISA requires plan fiduciaries to prioritize the interests of plan participants and
beneficiaries when making investment decisions for the plan.141 ERISA mandates specific
fiduciary duties stemming from trust law and requiring fiduciaries to exercise the same standard
of care and diligence that a prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances.142 This is
called ERISA’s fiduciary duty of prudence. ERISA also mandates that fiduciaries must act
solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of
providing financial benefits.143 This requirement is also known as the fiduciary’s duty of
loyalty.144 In addition to the duties of prudence and loyalty, the ERISA-regulated fiduciary also
has the duties to diversify the plan’s investments, follow the terms of a plan, and avoid conflicts
of interest and statutorily prohibited transactions.145
Some types of ERISA-regulated plans, including 401(k)s, can be set up so that the
participants choose where to direct their plan assets from a suite of employer-provided
investment options. When selecting investment options for a plan such as a 401(k), the plan
fiduciaries have specific obligations. Fiduciaries must have a “prudent process” that they rely
upon when selecting investments and service providers, must ensure that fees and other expenses
are reasonable, must select investments that are both “prudent” and “adequately diversified”, and
monitor the investment options and service providers to make sure they continue to be
appropriate choices for the plan.146
C. ERISA’s Fiduciary Duties and Fiduciaries’ Selection of Plan Investment Options
If an employer wants to offer an ESG investment option, such as one of the ESG choices
detailed above, the employer and any other fiduciaries involved in the decision must tread
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carefully to avoid running afoul of ERISA’s regulations governing investment selection.
Specifically, fiduciaries need to make sure they do not run afoul of ERISA’s duties of loyalty
and prudence.
The duty of loyalty issue is whether the fiduciary is allowed to consider benefits that this
type of investment option has on anyone other than the beneficiary—is it a violation of the duty
of exclusive loyalty to the beneficiary if the plan not only benefits the beneficiary and his assets,
but also benefits a third party, such as the fund manager, or the planet? Does that collateral
benefit mean that the fiduciary selecting an ESG option for inclusion in the lineup has violated
ERISA’s duty of loyalty? This is a procedural question—regardless of how positive the financial
performance of the ESG option is, does the fact that it also inherently benefits a third party make
it strictly off-limits for an ERISA-regulated plan?
The second issue is that of the duty of prudence. This issue gets to the investment
research process the fiduciary engaged in when choosing the investment choice, as well as the
substantive quality of the specific investment option included in the plan. Is it prudent, or
financially sound, to include an option in the lineup that only invests in companies that have
positive ESG impact? Presumably, this issue will depend upon what research the fiduciary
undertook when choosing the specific option, and how good of a financial investment the
specific ESG option is.
1. ERISA’ Duty of Loyalty and ESG Investing
The first fiduciary duty that comes up when discussing inclusion of ESG funds in a plan’s
lineup, and the one specifically targeted by the Trump ESG rule,147 is the fiduciary duty of
loyalty. ERISA’s fiduciary duty of loyalty requires plan fiduciaries to act in the best interest of
their beneficiaries’ plan assets, from an economic perspective. Fiduciaries cannot take into
account the larger scope of “best interest”, like making a different investment decision that might
be better for the beneficiaries’ work environment.
This narrow scope of “best interest” is dubbed “fund-first” by David Webber in his article
“The Use and Abuse of Labor’s Capital,” where he criticizes this narrow focus. 148 Webber
summarizes this understanding of the duty of loyalty as follows: “Under this same view, trustees
might similarly breach their fiduciary duties by negotiating to protect their participants’ jobs at
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some cost to return on investment, even if it would improve the investment’s net economic
benefit to fund participants and beneficiaries.”149
This article does not seek to criticize this fund-first approach to the duty of loyalty, no
matter how many good points David Webber brings up in his astute critique. This article simply
seeks to clarify that, under the duty of loyalty, a fiduciary has a duty to make investment
decisions that are in the sole interest of the beneficiaries’ assets in the plan. If the fiduciary takes
other considerations into mind and makes a slightly worse economic decision that has slightly
more extrinsic favorable impacts, like on the beneficiary’s job security, or on global warming,
that subjugation of the plan assets to that collateral benefit would be a violation of the fiduciary’s
duty of loyalty.
But what if the consideration of collateral benefits does NOT cause the plan or its
participants to lose money? What if we had a win-win scenario, like that offered by many
prudent ESG investment options, where a fund's consideration of ESG factors actually led to
similar or increased economic benefits for the beneficiaries’ assets? 150 Would it be a violation of
the duty of loyalty if, in addition to being in the best interest of the beneficiary’s assets, a
fiduciary’s investment decision also had a positive impact on a third party, say, the planet?151
ERISA case laws answers this question clearly—no. It is not a violation of the duty of
loyalty to make a decision that is both in the best interest of the beneficiaries' assets and provides
a collateral benefit to a third party. To establish a breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty, the
fiduciary would have needed to value someone else’s benefits over the benefits to the
participant’s assets.152 The district court in Donovan v. Walton clarified this point when it wrote
that ERISA’s duty of loyalty “does not prohibit a party other than a plan's participants and
beneficiaries from benefitting in some measure from a prudent transaction with the plan.
Furthermore, by adopting the ‘exclusive purpose’ standard, Congress did not intend to make
illegal the fact of life that most often a transaction benefits both parties involved.”153
From a court’s perspective, it doesn’t matter who the third party is—it could even be a
decision that benefits the actual fiduciary, as was the case in Metzler v. Graham.154 It’s not much
of a logical jump to assume that it could also be a decision that happens to benefit the planet. As
long as it is in the best interest of the beneficiaries’ portfolio, precedent would suggest it doesn’t
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violate the duty of loyalty if it also happens to help the planet. The fiduciary can make an
investment decision that is good for the planet, as long as it's the best one for the portfolio.
In his article criticizing ESG investing and arguing for exclusion of ESG funds from
retirement plans, Bernard Sharfman claimed that investing in ESG plans would inherently violate
ERISA’s duty of loyalty because of the collateral benefits it would have on society.155 He argued
that if a fund strategy pursued non-financial goals, such as cleaning up the environment, or
excluding investments in guns or tobacco, that collateral benefit would violate the sole benefit
rule and make the fiduciary liable for breach of his duty of loyalty.
This argument fails to recognize that a fiduciary can do both. If a fiduciary chooses an
actively managed fund that pursues the highest risk-adjusted return possible by including ESG
factors in the investment and screening out “bad” ESG companies because of their inherent
volatility and risk, that fiduciary would not be breaching his duty of loyalty. That fiduciary
would be following the portfolio management advice that the finance industry is shouting from
the rooftops: fiscally responsible investing requires analysts to consider the risks posed by
certain ESG factors and exclude “bad” ESG companies from funds if they pose too big of a risk
to the funds’ return.
Trust law professor Susan N. Gary emphasized that prudent selection of an ESG fund
would not violate a fiduciary’s duty of trust, because “growing evidence suggestions that ESG
information may improve returns, especially when a longer time horizon is considered.”156 As
such, she argued in a 2019 article that, “[a]s long as a strategy does not involve sacrificing
financial returns, then even if the duty of loyalty is defined as the duty to act solely in the
financial interests of the beneficiaries, the duty of loyalty is not compromised by a direction to
invest using a strategy that incorporates ESG criteria.”157
This way of thinking about ESG investing as permissible within the duty of loyalty is
consistent with the public policy and purpose of ERISA. Congress drafted ERISA to encourage
employers to establish retirement savings plans.158 ERISA preempts state legislation and offers
some protection to employers because Congress recognized that too much liability, or too much
confusion about which law prevails, will dissuade companies from offering retirement plans.159
Uncertainty and increased liability raise compliance costs, and higher compliance costs of
benefit plans will necessarily translate to fewer benefit plans.
Here too, if there is too much liability risk surrounding offering ESG, as under the
Trump-era rule, employers simply won’t offer it. We see that playing out right now, with only
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3% of employers offering an ESG option,160 even as supply of and demand for these high-quality
investment options is exploding.161
2. ERISA’s Duty of Prudence and ESG
The second fiduciary duty that is potentially at play in fiduciary’s wariness towards ESG
is the duty of prudence. ERISA’s fiduciary duty of prudence requires a fiduciary to investigate
and consider the relevant facts and circumstances of the investment choice. The duty does not
require a fiduciary to be prescient, or predict the actual outcome of an individual investment
decision.162 The duty of prudence does require that the fiduciary determine that a particular
investment is reasonably designed, and take into consideration the risk of loss and opportunity
for gain, including factors such as the diversification of the plan, the liquidity of the plan, and the
projected return of the plan.163 This duty basically asks the question, “did the fiduciary do his or
her due diligence?”
This duty looks more at the decision-making process, and less at the actual performance
of the selected investment. The duty of prudence depends on industry norms, and requires the
fiduciary to do the research and consider the factors that a prudent investor would.164
Courts have found a breach of the fiduciary duty of prudence when the fiduciary did not
engage in adequate process. For example, in Katsaros v. Cody, the Second Circuit found there
was a fiduciary breach of the duty of prudence because the pension fund made a $2 million loan
to a bank simply relying on a short presentation by the bank and without obtaining an
independent professional appraisal or analysis of the bank or collateral. There, the fiduciary
breached his duty of prudence because he did not do enough work to determine that the loan was
a safe one that would reasonably be repaid to the pension fund.165
Another example of a court finding a fiduciary breached his duty of prudence for lack of
due diligence in the process is Zanditon v. Feinstein, where the fiduciary merely relied upon a
co-trustee’s advice when selecting a plan and did not independently investigate the plan’s merits.
Here, he breached his fiduciary duty because he did not do his due diligence in researching the
plan prior to investing in it.166 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit found a fiduciary breached his duty
of prudence when he agreed to a fee schedule after only discussing it for ten minutes and not
giving it adequate study.167
In order for this failure of process to cause a breach of the duty of prudence, there must
be a causal link between the failure to investigate and the harm suffered by the plan.168
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Additionally, if a fiduciary does not engage in the proper research process, but makes a decision
that another “hypothetical prudent fiduciary” would have also made, that lack of research up
front also does not rise to the level of breach of a fiduciary’s duty of prudence.169
Given courts’ interpretations of a fiduciary’s duty of prudence, and the clear impact of
ESG factors on a fund’s performance, it seems there is an easy way for fiduciaries to avoid
liability under their duty of prudence when selecting an ESG fund for the plan lineup. The
fiduciary simply needs to engage in the same sort of research process he engages in when
choosing any sort of fund for the lineup. This process should include asking fund managers about
their strategy, their level of research, their expertise, their performance against a benchmark,
their fees, etc. As long as other prudent investors are making similar choices (and millions of
individual Americans and dozens of institutional investors are choosing to invest in ESG funds),
then a fiduciary need not worry about a beneficiary-instigated or Department of Labor-instigated
lawsuit for including a climate-friendly investment plan in the lineup.
Trust law professor Susan N. Gary argues that ESG investing does not violate the duty of
prudence for these same reasons. In her article entitled “Best Interests in the Long Term:
Fiduciary Duties and ESG Integration,” she argues that the fluid nature of the duty of prudence,
which changes with industry norms, means that as the financial industry has moved to adopt
ESG investment practices, the duty of prudence now allows, or even requires, a prudent fiduciary
to consider those factors as well.170 Her article cited to a United Nations report issued in
conjunction with the British law firm Freshfield Buckhaus Deringer, which analyzed fiduciary
duties applicable to investment decision-making and “concluded that integrating ESG
considerations into investment analysis was ‘clearly permissible’ and ‘arguably required.’”171
The duty of prudence requires that fiduciaries take the factors into consideration that a
prudent investor would—and prudent investors are starting to consider ESG factors even in nonESG funds. These are important factors that contribute to performance and impact a company’s
bottom line. Including ESG factors are absolutely part of the process of doing due diligence on a
company’s valuation and exposure to risk. As cited above, the chief operating and compliance
officer at a benefits firm explained that ESG considerations are simply “a new way of thinking
about the extra layer of qualitative due diligence.”172 Additionally, a white paper released by the
investment management firm Neurberger Merman stated that, “investors now expect that any
robust investment process should integrate material ESG considerations, and they are
increasingly seeking to define, measure and enhance the total impact of their investment.”173
Institutional investors are investing in ESG because it is a good financial strategy. It is
ludicrous for an ESG Rule to create a presumption that it is imprudent to consider ESG factors,
when the financial industry is explicitly stating it is imprudent NOT to consider those factors.
To reiterate the point above, the current ESG Rule, as it stands, puts a higher burden on
fiduciaries seeking to include ESG options in the lineup than fiduciaries seeking to include non169
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ESG investments in the lineup. The rule states that fiduciaries must prove the pecuniary nature of
the ESG factors or avail themselves of the laborious tie-breaker exclusion, in order to avoid the
risk of litigation. This placement of the burden of proof on the plan fiduciary upfront is directly
counter to the placement of the burden for any other type of investment, where plan sponsors can
choose to include any non-ESG fund in the plan, and only need to justify their fulfillment of the
duties of loyalty and prudence down the line, if they get sued.
In addition, in an ERISA litigation suit, the burden of proving a fiduciary breached or did
not breach his duty is almost never on the plan sponsor or the fiduciary!174 The burden of
proving that the fiduciary breached his duty is on the plan participant, or plaintiff—the fiduciary
almost never needs to prove it was not a violation of fiduciary duty (with a few rare, fact-specific
exceptions.)175 Mandating that a fiduciary has the burden of proving that including an ESG fund
is not a violation of the duty of loyalty is a clear double standard for ESG plans, and it denies
American investors the opportunity to avail themselves of one of the hottest and fastest growing
investment vehicles in the industry.
IV.

PRESIDENT BIDEN SHOULD “BUILD BACK” A “BETTER” ESG RULE

The current ESG Rule fails to recognize that employers can carry out ERISA’s goal of
secure retirement for American workers through offering an ESG option in retirement plan
lineups. This article suggests two approaches the Department of Labor can take to encourage
more employers to offer these attractive investment options to their employees. The Department
of Labor can either (1) rewrite the rule to shift the presumption back to a presumption that ESG
factors are pecuniary, or economically relevant, or (2) amend pre-existing safe harbor exceptions
or create a new safe harbor exception for plans that offer an ESG option, as long as they follow
certain requirements.
A. Shift the Presumption and Burden Back Where It Belongs
One approach the Department of Labor could take to explicitly allow employers to offer
ESG options in their 401(k) lineups would be to rewrite the ESG Rule to make it clear that ESG
factors should not be presumed to be non-pecuniary. In this scenario, the process for a fiduciary
to select and include an ESG option in a 401(k) investment lineup would be exactly the same
process they go through when choosing a non-ESG investment. The fiduciary could on his own,
or with the help of an investment consultant, consider the plan’s diversification, risk, fee
174
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structure, and historical performance relative to a benchmark.176 There would be no additional
work required upfront if the fiduciary was investigating an ESG option as opposed to a non-ESG
option.
Instead of fiduciaries needing to document up front their rationale for believing ESG
factors to be pecuniary, or to go through the steps of the tie-breaker exception, the re-written rule
could simply clarify that the Department of Labor presumes ESG factors are pecuniary, the same
presumption that any other non-ESG fund is afforded. If a beneficiary disagrees, and in the case
of a certain ESG plan, thinks that the type of ESG considerations in that plan were not
sufficiently economically relevant to the plan’s performance, the burden would be on the
beneficiary to prove that point in the course of a lawsuit.
This presumption and burden shift would remove the double standard for ESG funds that
currently places the burden on the fiduciary to upfront justify the consideration of ESG factors
and their relevance to the investment decision. Additionally, this would remove the added
litigation threat currently present in the ESG Rule which suggests that it is a violation of a
fiduciary’s duty of prudence to pick an investment option that has collateral benefits to the planet
(even though, as documented excessively above, these plans are arguably better for the
beneficiary, and certainly a fiduciary could demonstrate the plan selection was in the best interest
of the participant.)
The fiduciary then would have the same duty to monitor the performance of the ESG
option, just as they have the duty to monitor the performance of any other non ESG fund in the
plan lineup.177 If the ESG fund did not perform as predicted, or if any non ESG fund did not
perform as predicted, the fiduciary should remove that fund and restart the research process to
find a better one.
This type of rule would not require a fiduciary to justify up front if a specific ESG fund
was using ESG characteristics that were pecuniary or not--it would simply care about the same
things we care about in any plan investment selection: process and performance.
B. Encourage ESG Investment Inclusion by Creating a Safe Harbor for Lineups with ESG
An alternative method that the Department of Labor could pursue is to create a safe
harbor to encourage plan fiduciaries to include ESG investment options in their plan’s lineup. A
safe harbor is a way to create an exception to ERISA for plans that meet certain requirements. If
the plans meet the requirements of safe harbors, they are removed either from some ERISA
reporting and testing requirements, or in certain cases, removed entirely from ERISA’s
jurisdiction.
Safe harbors have the effect of massively lowering the compliance costs for certain types
of plans. ERISA reporting and compliance testing takes an enormous amount of time and is very
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costly, so if a company can avoid the time and expense of those reports and tests by complying
with a certain requirement from a safe harbor, in most cases they will comply with the safe
harbor. This is a way that Congress or the Department of Labor can encourage plans to be
drafted in certain ways, by effectively lowering the compliance costs and making it much
cheaper for an employer to offer a certain kind of benefit plan. Congress and the Department of
Labor have created a number of safe harbors for certain types of retirement plans, so this would
not be a deviation from the norm.
One example of Congress creating a safe harbor to encourage a new type of retirement
plan design is the safe harbor for plans that auto-enroll employees in their 401(k) retirement
savings plans as they qualify, rather than requiring the employees to go through the hassle of
enrolling themselves.178 If an employee does not want to participate in the plan, they can opt out.
The idea of auto-enrolling employees in retirement plans as a nudge to get them to participate in
higher numbers, and thus save more for retirement, came from behavioral economist Richard
Thaler, who eventually won the Nobel Prize for his research on behavioral economics and how
employers could adjust plan design to automatically encourage more employees to save.179
Recognizing that auto-enrollment was a desirable feature for retirement plans, Congress
created a safe harbor in the Pension Protection Act of 2006.180 The safe harbor provided that
401(k) plans with an auto-enroll feature meeting certain requirements are exempt from the
nondiscrimination rules and tests for deferrals and matching contributions, and are exempt from
certain “top heavy” rules.181 Unsurprisingly, retirement plan providers jumped at the chance to
avoid the expensive and time-consuming nondiscrimination and top heavy rules, and exempted
themselves from those rules by adjusting their plans to auto-enroll participants.
As a result of the safe harbor for plans that auto-enroll beneficiaries, plans with an autoenroll feature doubled over the course of ten years, from 35.6% in 2007 to 59.7% in 2016.182
This is not surprising. When regulation makes a certain type of plan construction cheaper,
companies will adopt that type of plan construction. And, in this case, adopting this type of plan
construction had massive positive impacts on plan participation and retirement saving--auto
enrollment nearly doubled plan participation and successfully enrolled participants who
otherwise would not have saved for retirement.183 A Vanguard study from 2015 found that in
recent years, auto-enrollment has more than doubled plan participation rates, from 42% without
auto-enroll to more than 91% participation with an auto-enroll feature. This is an example of
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Congress intentionally lowering the compliance costs of ERISA for certain plans in order to
encourage plans to be designed in that desirable way.
Other types of safe harbors completely shield fiduciaries from liability under certain
conditions. The ERISA Section 404(c) safe harbor, for example, shields fiduciaries from liability
for a beneficiary’s investment decision that leads to plan losses. This safe harbor is also known
as “the large menu defense.” The 404(c) safe harbor states that as long as the plan offers a broad
range of investment options, allows the beneficiary to control their investments, and sufficiently
educates the beneficiary about the investment options, the fiduciary is not liable for an individual
beneficiary’s investment choice that leads to investment losses.184 This means that, if a fiduciary
sets out a large enough menu of investment choices in a lineup and properly educates the
participant about the options, and the participant chooses an option that ends up performing
poorly, the participant should not prevail in a lawsuit against the fiduciary to recover the loss of
his plan assets.185
This safe harbor may sound like it already protects fiduciaries from liability for including
an ESG plan in their lineup, as long as there are enough investment options in the lineup and the
fiduciary provides enough information to educate the participant about his options.
The Department of Labor, however, explicitly explained that the 404(c) defense does not
apply to plan investment selection decisions.186 The Department of Labor clarified that the
404(c) shield cannot be used as a defense against an allegation of breach of the duty of prudence,
and investment selection choices fall within the duty of prudence. Plan investments still must be
prudently selected, and 404(c) will not protect a fiduciary who does not select good investment
options. 404(c) only protects a fiduciary if one of those prudently selected investments ends up
with poor performance, and the participant tries to sue the fiduciary for having invested in that
option as opposed to one of the plan’s other prudent options.187
Some courts have disagreed with the agency’s interpretation of the 404(c) safe harbor,
and argue that the 404(c) protection should extend to fiduciary decisions in selecting plan
investments. The Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have held that the 404(c) large menu
defense does apply to protect fiduciary decisions made at the investment selection level.188 Many
of these cases have centered on the issue of excessive fees, where beneficiaries sued the fiduciary
for losses to their plan assets due to an allegedly excessive fee structure. In numerous cases,
these circuit courts have held that the 404(c) large menu defense applies, and that fiduciaries are
184
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not liable as long as they took the steps required to avail themselves of 404(c), namely offering
enough options, enough choice, and sufficient investor education.189
1. Expand the 404(c) Safe Harbor to Shield Fiduciaries from ESG-related Liability
One simple type of safe harbor that the Department of Labor could set up to encourage
fiduciaries to offer an ESG option would be to simply amend the 404(c) safe harbor to include
protections for a fiduciary’s decision to include an ESG option. This could be done in one of two
ways.
First, the Department of Labor could retract their prior regulation stating that 404(c) does
not apply to plan investment selection, and instead adopt the position taken by the Third,
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits that it does protect decisions at the plan level. The problem with
this broad expansion of the safe harbor, however, is that it may end up protecting plan
investment decisions that the Labor Department does not want to protect, such as choosing
investment options that have excessive fees. It is not targeted specifically at including ESG
options, so this broad safe harbor may do more harm than good.
A narrower expansion of the 404(c) safe harbor could specifically only extend the safe
harbor to the decision to include an ESG option. The 404(c) regulation could be rewritten to state
that this safe harbor does not extend to any decision made at the plan investment selection phase,
except for the decision to add a prudently selected ESG plan. This would still require that the
ESG investment be prudently selected, and would not shield the fiduciary from liability for
picking a “bad” ESG investment. It would, however, shield a fiduciary from liability if they
followed the steps to pick a prudent ESG investment (detailed above in the duty of prudence
section), and then for whatever reason the investment did not perform as expected, and the
participant wanted to sue to recoup losses.
This narrow expansion of the 404(c) large menu defense safe harbor to protect a
fiduciary’s decision to include an ESG option would lower the compliance costs of including
ESG, and would be expected to lead to more ESG investments getting added to retirement plan
lineups. Fiduciaries would just need to follow the 404(c) instructions and then could rest assured
they would be protected in case of plan losses down the line. If a plan provides a broad menu of
options, one of which is a prudently selected ESG investment option, a fiduciary could raise a
complete 404(c) defense to a beneficiary suing for plan losses they claimed were due to the
fiduciary’s categorical selection of an ESG option. If beneficiaries could no longer sue a
fiduciary for simply choosing an ESG option, fiduciaries would be encouraged, or at least not
discouraged, to include an ESG option in their plan lineup.
2. Draft a New Safe Harbor Explicitly for ESG Investment Options
An alternative to expanding the 404(c) safe harbor defense to include the plan selection
of an ESG investment could be to draft an entirely new safe harbor that applies only to ESG
investments. This might be a more desirable approach for the Department of Labor to take, rather
than just expanding 404(c) protection to ESG investments, since an ESG-specific safe harbor
could be drafted in a way that takes ESG-specific investing into consideration. For example, the
safe harbor could include specific process requirements that the fiduciary would need to do
upfront in order to qualify for the safe harbor and remove the risk of litigation. There might be a
requirement that the ESG fund have a certain number of years of outperformance of a non-ESG
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benchmark, to prove that the choice of this fund is in the sole economic interest of the
beneficiary, and that the beneficiary’s assets would not be taking a hit relative to how they’d
perform in a non-ESG fund. Also, it could put certain limitations on the type of ESG
investments that could be included, perhaps only allowing a safe harbor for ESG funds that are
actively managed, rather than passively managed, since ESG investment research seems to
indicate that actively managed ESG funds perform better than passively managed ESG funds.190
The problem with the Department of Labor creating a prescriptive safe harbor for certain
types of ESG investment process choices is that it assumes that the Department of Labor is in a
better position to mandate the requirements for a good ESG fund better than the fiduciary
himself. Creating a rule where the Department of Labor, rather than the fiduciary, sets the
process and parameters for which ESG funds are eligible for inclusion in the safe harbor not only
presumes the agency knows better than the fiduciary, but it also risks becoming an inflexible
regulation that is set in stone in the Federal Register. This safe harbor could become too difficult
to change and update as the investment research changes and certain ESG strategies end up
performing better than others. It also continues the differential treatment of ESG funds, which
could stigmatize them.
While this kind of detailed and prescriptive safe harbor may give the Department of
Labor an illusion of control and feelings of certainty that only “safe” ESG investments will
qualify for protection under the safe harbor, this approach does risk becoming antiquated and
resistant to change, as the updating and amending of rules takes agency attention, time, and
coordination.
Ultimately, there are pros and cons for each approach the Department of Labor could take
when updating the ESG Rule. This article sets out the argument in favor of updating the ESG
Rule to encourage employers to offer ESG options in their lineups, and sets out a number of
recommendations for the agency’s consideration. The Department of Labor could completely
rewrite the rule, amend pre-existing safe harbors, or draft a new safe harbor. The need for a
regulatory change is clear, but various paths are plausible.
C. Work in Tandem with Other Government Agencies
No matter which path the Department of Labor chooses to follow, it would be a good
idea for the Labor Department to work hand-in-hand with other agencies attending to ESG
regulation. In particular, the Department of Labor should work with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, which has also recently stated their intent to regulate heavily in the area of ESG.
The current SEC, which is technically an independent agency191 but has a chairperson
appointed by the President,192 has made multiple moves early in the Biden Administration to
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signal its desire to push for sustainable investing. In early March of 2021, the SEC created a new
Climate and ESG Task Force193 and throughout the late winter and early spring, filled up its
ranks with environmentally-conscious new leaders.194 These moves signal an enhanced focus on
regulating corporations’ environmental impacts.195 Specifically, the SEC intends to standardize
ESG disclosures so that investors can accurately assess and value corporate exposure to climate
change.196
The current lack of standardized disclosures makes it difficult for investors and
consumers to truly understand the environmental impact a company has, or the company’s
exposure to climate change risks.197 It also allows some companies to engage in “greenwashing,”
where they make their environmental impact look more positive than it really is by manipulating
what metrics they are using to report ESG impacts.198 Uncertainty about the extent or
comprehensiveness of a company’s ESG disclosures makes it difficult for investors to trust they
are getting the full picture of a company’s ESG exposure or impact. More than half of the
respondents to a BlackRock survey cited concerns about “poor quality or availability of ESG
data and analytics” as the biggest barrier to engaging in sustainable investing.199
Standardized and mandatory ESG disclosures will give investors a better understanding
of how companies really stack up with their climate change risk and ESG impact. Robust
disclosures will allow ESG investors to better select which companies truly belong in an ESG
fund. This increased disclosure and proper valuation of risk and impact will allow employees to
better trust that their assets will be safe in an ESG fund. The SEC and the Labor Department
should coordinate their efforts to achieve maximum impact, by allowing for proper valuation of
climate risk, minimizing greenwashing, and encouraging the investment of retirement plan assets
in sustainable businesses.
CONCLUSION
The Department of Labor’s most recent anti-ESG ESG Rule stands in the way of
consumer demand for access to sustainable investments. It is the number one, if not only, barrier

193

Alexandra N. Farmer et al, Enforcement Task Force Announcement is Latest Sign of SEC Focus on ESG and
Climate, Kirkland Ellis: Kirkland Alert (Mar. 8, 2021), https://www.kirkland.com/publications/kirklandalert/2021/03/sec-climate-and-esg-task-force.
194
Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Satyam Khanna Named Senior Policy Advisor for
Climate and ESG (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-20; Andrew Ramonas, ESG
Reporting Top Priority for SEC Director on Leave from Harvard, Bloomberg Tax (Feb. 24, 2021),
https://news.bloombergtax.com/financial-accounting/esg-reporting-top-priority-for-sec-director-on-leave-fromharvard.
195
Mark Schoeff Jr., Gensler Quizzed on Climate Disclosure, Mandatory Arbitration in Confirmation Hearing,
INVESTMENTNEWS (Mar. 2, 2021), https://www.investmentnews.com/gensler-quizzed-on-climate-disclosuremandatory-arbitration-in-confirmation-hearing-203419.
Andrew Ramonas, ESG Reporting Top Priority for SEC Director on Leave from Harvard, Bloomberg Tax (Feb. 24,
2021), https://news.bloombergtax.com/financial-accounting/esg-reporting-top-priority-for-sec-director-on-leavefrom-harvard.
197
Dana Brakman Reiser & Anne Tucker, Buyer Beware: Variation and Opacity in ESG and ESG Index Funds, 41
CARDOZO L. REV. 1921 (2020)
198
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/portfolio-warming-climate-anxiety-fund-100032539.html.
199
Press Release, BlackRock, BlackRock Survey Shows Acceleration of Sustainable Investing (Dec. 3, 2020),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/newsroom/press-releases/article/corporate-one/press-releases/blackrocksurvey-shows-acceleration-of-sustainable-investing.

34

to Americans investing their retirement assets in greener, cleaner investment options that align
with their values.
This article argues that a simple regulatory change will have significant impacts on
retirement savings and sustainable investments at the margin. But saving and investing at the
margin still matters. Given the nature of compound interest, if a 28-year-old millennial employee
ends up saving an additional $100/month, pre-tax, because of a desirable investment option in
her retirement account, that additional savings will compound to an additional $399,447.78 at
retirement, if she retires at 65 and we assume an annual return of 10%. Marginal regulatory
changes with marginal impacts on retirement savings behavior have outsized impacts on
retirement security.
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